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THE TREASURY BILL MARKET IN PORTUGAL





This work examines the process of formation of
market participants’ profit. The results of this
work are not obtained within the context of a bid-
ding model for Treasury Bills (TB). Since in our
view there is no realistic theoretical model of a TB
auction, it is not possible to derive an equilibrium
bidding strategy. Thus, the results of this work are
based on some of the major implications of the
standard theory of common value auctions(1).
Other related works are Bikhchandani and Huang
(1989), Cammack (1991), Jegadeesh (1993), Umlauf
(1993) and Bikhchandani et al. (1994).
TB are one of the most important domestic pub-
lic debt instruments (see Adão and Luís (1996)). TB
are sold at auctions. Considering the relevance of
these securities in the context of public debt and
the fact that public debt interest contribute deci-
sively to the budgetary deficit(2) it seems impor-
tant to analyse the Treasury’s revenue within the
scope of the methodology chosen to sell TB. This
issue is even more important taken into account
that Portugal’s entry into stage three of EMU de-
pends on the reduction of both the deficit and the
public debt, in percentage of GDP.
TB prices in the primary market are influenced
by a wide range of factors. Since the Treasury car-
ries out regular TB auctions, the secondary market
may have available close substitutes for the TB to
be issued (i.e., securities with terms to maturity
similar to those of T-bills to be issued)(3) which can
have an effect on primary market prices. TB pri-
mary market prices can also be affected by the is-
suing of short-term private bonds, in particular,
commercial paper.
The Portuguese TB market has already been
studied, although from other perspectives, in
Branco (1994). This work examines the format of
“independent values” auctions (auctions where
each bidder values the object at auction independ-
ently of other bidders' valuation) with price dis-
crimination when some bidders have only public
information and others have private information
in addition. The major result is that when less in-
formed bidders are authorised to submit non-
competitive bids (only competing for quantities at
a given price), the Treasury is able to obtain higher
revenue than at auctions in which all bidders sub-
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / June 1997 35
Articles
* An earlier version of this work was presented at the Meeting
on Aspects of Public Debt Management in Portugal, on 28 Feb-
ruary 1996. The authors wish to thank the comments made by
Sushil Bikhchandani, Álvaro Braga, Fernando Branco, Nuno
Cassola, Vitor Gaspar, Ana Cristina Leal, Maximiano Pinheiro,
Nuno Ribeiro, Carlos Robalo, and specially José Ferreira
Machado, whose comments led to a much more precise and
legible econometric test. The authors have also profited from
the observations made by the participants in the mentioned
meeting. Any remaining errors are obviously the exclusive re-
sponsibility of the authors.
The opinions of this paper represent the views of the author,
they are not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal.
** Economic Research Department.
(1) For example, Milgrom and Weber (1982).
(2) In 1995, public debt interest surpassed the public deficit,
amounting to PTE 1,005 billion, which compares to a PTE 896.5
billion deficit.
(3) For example, when 91-day TB are auctioned, the 182-day TB
auctioned 91 days before also have a 91-day period to matur-
ity.mit competitive bids (competing for quantity and
price simultaneously).
Another study on the Portuguese TB market
may be found in Gordy (1993), who considers the
utilised method as being an auction of a divisible
good in which the reservation price(4) is fixed bef-
ore the auction takes place. This study does not
use secondary market data and assumes that TB
auctions follow the independent value auctions
model. Gordy (1993) concludes that the Treasury
would have obtained a lower revenue if the re-
serve price were fixed after the Treasury was in-
formed of the bids.
The next section presents the major implica-
tions of the common value theory for the TB mar-
ket. The third section presents a regression equa-
tion for profit margins. The fourth section displays
the major results of the econometric analysis and
the last section shows the main conclusions.
2. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMON
VALUES THEORY IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF
BIDDERS IN TB AUCTIONS
In this section we intend to present the implica-
tions of the models of TB auctions which shall be
analysed in a brief and heuristic manner. The auc-
tion theory usually distinguishes between two
models: the common value auctions (CV) and the
independent private value auctions (IPV).
In a CV auction, it is assumed that the value of
the objects being auctioned is the same for all the
bidders. This does not mean that the bidders know
ex-ante the value of the objects being auctioned,
but instead, that whoever the bidder acquiring the
objects may be, he will obtain the same resale
price. Moreover, every bidder receives private and
imperfect information on the value of the objects,
on which their bids are based. In an IPV auction,
bidders know the value of the object being auc-
tioned has for them but their valuations are inde-
pendently distributed. For instance, the auction of
an art masterpiece may resemble an IPV auction.
Private and imperfect information of the bid-
ders in a TB auction is obtained from different
sources: own forecasts on the term structure of in-
terest rates, on the inflation and the exchange
rates, own liquidity surpluses and amounts of the
acquisition orders submitted, prior to the auctions,
by institutional investors, such as pension funds.
When a candidate raises his bidding price, he
faces a dilemma between, on the one hand, a
higher probability of his bid winning and, on the
other hand, obtaining lower profit should the bid
be accepted. In a CV situation, bidders may incur
in the winner’s curse. That happens if every bid-
der has a non-biased estimate of the price of the
object, the winning bidders will be more optimis-
tic as to the true value of the object. Therefore, ob-
taining the object at the auction may be disadvan-
tageous for the purchaser, since this may mean
that the bidder assigns an excessively high value
to the auctioned object, while every other competi-
tor assigns a lower value to the object, presumably
closer to its true market value. The winner’s curse
has been detected in some auctions — for instance,
in bids for authorisations for oil prospecting (see
Capen et al. (1971)).
The winner’s curse has consequences at the
level of the optimal bidding strategy. Equilibrium
bidding strategies in first and second price auc-
tions(5) imply that the candidates should bid in a
more conservative manner, below their ex-ante es-
timate on the true value of the object. This would
permit that, on average, no ex-post losses would be
recorded.
Secondly, ceteris paribus, when the number of
bidders increases, the optimum behaviour may be
to bid in a more conservative manner, since the
highest of 100 estimates on a given variable is
likely to be higher than the highest of 10 estimates.
However, an increase in the number of bidders
raises competition, in so far as it reduces the win-
ning probability of any bid. Thus, the net effect of
an increase in the number of bidders on the price
offered (or on the profit margin) may be either
negative or positive, depending on the nature of
the equilibrium strategy and on the distribution of
private information. Wilson (1988) shows that for
some plausible examples,(6) on average, the profit
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(4) Minimum selling price accepted by the Treasury.
(5) First price auctions are those where the price of sale is the high-
est value bidded. Second price auctions are those where the
price of sale is the second highest value bidded.
(6) In cases in which the prices offered by the institutions partici-
pating in the auctions have normal or log-normal distributions.margin of the bidders decreases in line with the
number of bidders.
Thirdly, ceteris paribus, as uncertainty on the
value of the object increases, the winner’s curse is
stronger, and bidders become more conservative,
which leads to higher (ex-post) profits for the ra-
tional bidders(7). Henceforth, the seller may raise
the sale price, should he commit himself in ad-
vance to make his private information available to
bidders, so as to reduce uncertainty. Although this
may seem to go against intuition, bidders have the
highest profits when they have less information at
their disposal(8). On the limit, if the true value is
known to all participants, the expected profit will
be null.
The presence of the above effects in the TB mar-
ket, within the scope of CV auctions, will be ana-
lysed in the next section in which we attempt to
evaluate the effect of uncertainty, of the number of
candidates, of the competition levels and of other
relevant variables on the profit margins of the in-
stitutions participating in the primary market.
3. A MODEL FOR PROFIT MARGINS ON THE
TB MARKET
This section includes the results of the regres-
sions of profit margins. The regression equation
specified was the following:
MARGINS STD O N SUBAMOUNT tt t =+ + + bb b 01 2 (/)
++ + bb 4 3 VAR RATE INDAMOUNT tt ()
++ be 5 SPREADtt
The dependent variable — MARGINS — was
calculated as the ratio of profit to the bid price
paid. Profits are the difference between the resale
price and the purchase price, calculated as follows:




PRICEit = price in market i in the auction oc-
curred in t.
i = primary market (p), secondary
market (s).
RATEit = average interest rate (per auction)
on date t in which an auction took
place.
TERM = term of TB auctioned (days).
Since the information available on the secon-
dary market is composed of monthly series, we
had to assume the hypothesis that the interest rate
of the secondary market in each auction () RATESt
corresponds to:




tt t =× + - ×










-1= secondary market rate in the month
prior to the auction;
DAYt = month day of the auction.
During the period under study institutions
were subject to different reserve requirements
schemes, with an impact on the prices of TB, since
the inclusion of these securities and the respective
repurchase agreements in the incidence basis of
cash reserves during part of the period rose the
costs of placement of TB to the public. This led
banks to demand a relatively higher price for the
sale of TB, and/or to cut their purchase price at
auction. Though, the net effect of this element of
the reserve requirements scheme is not totally
clear-cut, the possibility that profit margins might
have been affected is not to be rejected. As a result,
margins were adjusted for the cost of the building
up of cash reserves. Hence, the adjusted margins
(MARGCORR) became the dependent variable (in
basis points), calculated as follows:
MARGCORR
PPr r r P
P
RCl C OR R R
C =
-- - .( )
where
P
R = resale price;
P
C = purchase price;
r
t = reserve requirement coefficient;
r
co = cost of opportunity rate;
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(7) See Milgrom and Weber (1982).
(8) This result may also be considered expected. Generally, in the
financial markets, a higher degree of uncertainty leads higher
interest rates.r
RR = rate of remuneration of reserve requi-
rements, paid by the Banco de Portu-
gal.
In the period under analysis, reserve require-
ments were remunerated at an interest rate that re-
flected the money market rates, so as to compen-
sate the institutions for the cost of not having those
reserves available for short-term investments. Tak-
ing into account the problems shown by money
market rates, the standing absorption facility rate
was selected as proxy for the opportunity cost (see
Adão and Luís (1996)).
In order to measure the uncertainty effect intro-
duced by the IMM, we used variable STD(O/Nt)
which consists in the standard-deviation of the
IMM overnight rate in the week prior to the auc-
tion(9) (in basis points). The underlying concept is
that, as supported by the common value theory,
the higher is the ex-ante uncertainty, the higher
will be the possibility that a bidder may incur in
the winner’s curse, and more conservative he will
be in his bids. As a result, should this relationship
occur, the standard-deviation of the overnight rate
shall be positively correlated with the profit mar-
gins.
The VAR(RATE)t variable, which consists in the
variance of the interest rates of bids accepted by
the Treasury in each auction (in basis points), shall
permit to measure uncertainty effects, other than
that due to the interbank money market. It is ex-
pected that, should the winner’s curse occur, the
coefficient will be positive. In contrast, if the coeffi-
cient is negative, it may mean that price collusion
situations have occurred, in which participating
institutions increase their results reducing the
range of their bidding rates.
It might firstly be considered that every type of
uncertainty would be reflected in variable
VAR(RATE), therefore it would not be necessary to
use also STD(O/N)t variable. However, this latter
variable does not reveal to be significant in the ex-
planation of the former variable. On the other
hand, the uncertainty effect is not necessarily re-
flected in VAR(RATE)t, if collusive situations oc-
cur(10).
SUBAMOUNTt is the total amount of the bids
submitted by the participants in each auction (in
PTE billion). This variable measures the effect of
the increase in the demand in TB auctions(11). This
means that if we have a negative coefficient, the
market may be accepted to be competitive; there-
fore, the increase in demand implies a decrease in
profits(12).
INDAMOUNTt is the indicative amount of TB
to be auctioned, announced by the Treasury
through the Banco de Portugal (in PTE billion).
When the coefficient assumes a positive value,
profits increase in line with the amount that the
Treasury intends to auction. This relation can be
envisaged as a result of the pressure put by bor-
rowing requirements on primary market rates
(and on profit margins) when the Treasury intends
to obtain more financing(13).
SPREADt is the differential between interest
rates of credit to non-financial firms and individu-
als and time deposit rates (in percentage points).
This variable is intended to measure the effect of
the margins obtained by financial institutions from
alternative products on TB market profit margins,
and its coefficient should be positive.
The specification submitted, however, does not
include any dynamics in the relationship between
the above variables. A way to surpass such prob-
lem consists in considering an auto-regressive be-
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(9) A week was the period used taking into account the average
reserve maintenance periods. In Umlauf (1993), the variance is
used instead of the standard-deviation. However, variance
shows a more volatile behaviour.
(10)Another case in which uncertainly might not be reflected in
VAR(RATE)t is when increases in money-market rates lead to
increases in the rates submitted in the auctions, but also to the
acceptance by the Treasury of a reduced share of these bids,
centred on the lowest rates.
(11)At first, as a replacement for this variable, the number of par-
ticipants was tested in line with Umlauf (1993) and, after-
wards, the ratio of the submitted amount to the indicative
amount of the auction and the ratio of the submitted amount
to the issued amount, in line with Cammack (1991) and Je-
gadeesh (1993), with worse statistical results (moreover, the
utilisation of the first ratio would lead to a change in the mean-
ing of the coefficient of the INDAMOUNTt variable, since this
variable corresponds to the denominator of the ratio).
(12)In contrast, a positive coefficient may be interpreted as an im-
plication of the winner’s curse, since when we assume that, ce-
teris paribus, demand increases when the number of
participants increases, the rise in the number of participants
will lead to a more conservative optimal behaviour.
(13)The secondary market interest rates reveal more inertia than
the primary market rates when there are changes in the short
term interest rates, either upwards or downwards. In a collu-
sive situation, a negative correlation may suggest the downfall
of agreements between financial institutions in larger auctions.haviour for the profit margins. This autocorrela-
tion will result if institutions include past behav-
iour and results in their decision process.
4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE PROFIT
MARGINS OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
Data used concern all the bids submitted in
every auction from January 1990 to December
1995(14). The analysis was separately carried out
for the three existing types of TB, every series hav-
ing revealed stationarity, except SPREAD(15). Out
of the 754 auctions (275, 298 and 181 for TB at 91,
182 and 364 days, respectively), only 692 were con-
sidered (248, 279 and 165 for each of the those ma-
turities), since the auctions in which no bids were
accepted were eliminated(16).
The econometric work was based on the study
of the regression previously presented, for the
whole period and for every type of TB. The devel-
opment pattern of profit margins strongly sug-
gests the presence of an autoregressive compo-
nent, an expectation which was confirmed by the
improvement obtained in results after the intro-
duction of the lagged endogenous variable(17).
We also had to take into account the influence
of several phenomena of an extraordinary nature
affecting the results obtained, in particular in the
period of high volatility of the interest rates in
1990-1991 and in the periods affected by instability
in the foreign exchange market. Therefore, we de-
cided to introduce several dummy variables (de-
fined in Appendix) permitting to identify those ef-
fects, covering a relatively short number of obser-
vations (14, 12 and 6 auctions of 91-, 182- and 364-
day TB, respectively, always below 6 per cent of
the total sample) which permitted to improve the
statistical results, thus obtaining increases of ap-
proximately 0.1 in the adjusted R2 (18).
As expected, the quality of the regressions re-
vealed to be higher in longer maturities, since 91-
day TB auctions are less frequently suspended on
occasions of disturbances on the monetary and
foreign-exchange markets and, therefore, the aver-
age rates of allocation are more volatile(19).
The major results obtained are listed in table 1.
The regression with two lags on the endogenous
variable seemed better for the 91-day maturity(20),
while in the other maturities the second lag of the
dependent variable did not prove statistically sig-
nificant.
We may then state the following most signifi-
cant conclusions:
– The uncertainty resulting from the IMM,
measured by the standard-deviation of the
overnight rates seems to have scarcely affect
the profit margins of the bidders, since they
only have statistical significance in the case
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(14)Despite the information available on the auctions carried out
since June 1988, the data base utilised for the econometric work
was limited due to restrictions in the availability of information
on the secondary TB market and on the interbank money mar-
ket (whose series start in January 1990).
(15)In the ADF tests (with constant and without trend) done for the
endogenous variable, the t-ratios of the lagged endogenous
variable were always higher than 3.2 in absolute value, allow-
ing to reject the null hypothesis of unit root, for significance lev-
els around 2.5 per cent. In the test for the independent
variables, the only figures for t-ratios below 3 were obtained for
SPREAD. In this situation, the non-stationarity is probably due
to the limited period covered by the sample, given that an inter-
est rate spread has to be a stationary variable. Considering this
point, the statistical relevance of SPREAD and the fact of having
been obtained identical results for the remaining parameters in
regressions without SPREAD, we decided to maintain this vari-
able.
(16)As well as an auction in which the Banco de Portugal pur-
chased the total amount auctioned and the interest rate of
placement was not made known.
(17)It must be noted, once again, that though the markedly autore-
gressive behaviour (with estimations for the sum of the autore-
gressive coefficients consistently above 0.84) it is rejected the
null hypothesis of unit root. The high t-ratios for the first lag are
due to auto-regressive characteristics of the variable. It was also
considered, as alternative, to specify the dependent variable in
first differences, corresponding to imposing the constraint of
unit root. This procedure provided similar results, though with
a worse econometric fit. Consequently, we chose to specify the
dependent variable in level and to use its lags as explanatory
variables. In this issue, we benefited from the suggestions of
José Ferreira Machado, Nuno Cassola, Nuno Ribeiro and Carlos
Robalo.
(18)Additionally, we considered the fact that some of the regres-
sors are not pre-determined variables. However, the Hausman
specification test was carried out, and the null hypothesis of
the consistency of estimators was not rejected for all the TB
(the lowest p-value obtained equalled 0.791).
(19)We thank the comments made by Nuno Ribeiro on this sub-
ject.
(20)The selection of a model among those presenting distinct lags
was developed according to the Schwarz criterion.
(21)Even in this case, the value of the t-ratio exceeds only margin-
ally the value of the distribution function to a 5 per cent sinifi-
cance level.of 91-day TB(21). Thus, it is not possible to
conclude whether the profits of the institu-
tions are affected or not by uncertainty on
the IMM.
– Demand at auctions, measured by the total
amount of the bids submitted, also seems to
have negatively affect profit margins in
every maturity. It may then be acknowled-
ged that the TB market is competitive, since
an increase in demand implies a decrease in
profit margins(22).
– The variance of the rates on the bids accep-
ted seems to positively affect profit margins.
This means that the institutions respond to
uncertainty with other than IMM origin, in
the way forecasted by the common value
theory, becoming more conservative in or-
der to avoid the winner’s curse.
– The indicative amount announced by the
Treasury is also positively correlated with
profit margins. Therefore, the behaviour of
participants in the Portuguese TB markets
does not allow for the rejection of the
hypothesis that the Treasury may reduce its
financing costs through a decrease in the
amounts auctioned per session, with an in-
crease in the number of auctions. According
to Bank of England (1995) this result was al-
ready observed in Australia, Canada and
United Kingdom, as regards medium- and
long-term debt.
5. FINAL REMARKS
This work presents the econometric results on
the trend of profit margins in the Portuguese TB
market and respective determinants, under the
light of the common value auction theory, in the
period from 1990 to 1995. The results obtained are
consistent with the hypothesis of the winners'
curse, i.e., that profits raised by bidders increase as
the uncertainty increases. Thus, it seems that the
Treasury may improve its results if it manages to
decrease uncertainty at auctions (for instance, by





CONSTANT 2.0194 -3.4279 4.3765
(1.617) (1.628) (0.933)
STD(O/N) -0.0286 -0.0982 -0.1749
(2.043) (0.766) (0.629)
SUBAMOUNT -0.1279 -0.0708 -0.0533
(9.743) (7.168) (3.521)
VAR(RATE) 1.5847 0.5311 1.0816
(4.0807) (3.903) (3.192)
INDAMOUNT 0.1255 0.0957 0.0337
(2.5151) (3.044) (0.754)
SPREAD 9.4336 14.4874 -0.3719
(3.825) (3.600) (0.044)
MARGINS (t-1) 0.7359 0.9138 0.9175
(19.775) (56.354) (43.331)
MARGINS(t-2) 0.1067 - -
(2.952)
N 246 278 164
R
2 adjusted 0.914 0.943 0.940
Q(1) 0.247 0.001 0.083
Q(2) 0.250 0.048 2.894
Q(3) 0.806 0.102 4.602
Q(10) 3.087 5.796 11.113
ARCH Test 1.102 0.143 1.239
ChowTest 1.335 1.004 0.591
White Test 59.172 37.962 24.944
Notes:
T-values are in brackets.
N  -  Number of observations.
Q(p) - Statistic of Ljung-Box autocorrelation test of order (p). The
low values obtained suggest that there is not autocorrela-
tion of order (p).
ARCH test - Test of ARCH(1) residuals, consisting on the t-ratio
of the parameter of the regression of the squared residu-
als on the lagged square residuals. The low values obtai-
ned suggest that there are not ARCH residuals.
Chow test - F-test of stability of the parameters. The low values
obtained point to the stability of the parameters.
White test - test of heteroskedasticity of the residuals, depending
on the exogenous variables. The values obtained are
lower than those of the Chi-square distribution, with
k(k-1)/2+2k degrees of freedom (k=number of parame-
ters).
(22)This conclusion may also be obtained if the variable “number of
participants” is utilised, albeit with lower overall statistical re-
sults. Therefore, we seem to obtain a conclusion similar to that
of Wilson (1988), that when the number of participants in-
creases, margins decrease.supplying information on its behaviour or on the
overall behaviour of the participants in previous
auctions). Evidence was also obtained that the
Treasury may benefit from the widening of the
range of potential participants in the primary mar-
ket(23)(24). In fact, the market seems to be competi-
tive, since there is a negative correlation between
the number of participants and the margins.
An additional conclusion is that the profit mar-
gins of financial institutions seem to be positively
correlated with the indicative amounts to be auc-
tioned, which means that the Treasury may try to
reduce its net financing costs through an increase
in the frequency of the auctions(25).
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(23)For instance, to Investment Funds or other investors not con-
nected with banking groups (insurance companies, pension
funds, large non-financial companies with huge cash bal-
ances).
(24)This possibility of a wider participation in public debt auctions
was already authorised, for instance, in the United Kingdom,
where non-financial firms and individuals have access to the
medium- and long-term primary market, with the minimum
acquisition amount set at £500,000 (nominal value of the
stocks), as mentioned in Bank of England (1993).
(25)The Treasury has already been doing it, as mentioned above.Appendix
Meaning of the dummy variables
91 TB
D1i (i=1, …,9) — dummy variables assuming
the unit value in the observations in which the re-
siduals of the same regression, albeit without arti-
ficial variables, have anomalous values (in the auc-
tions on 21 and 28 June 1990; 27 August 1992; 2
October 1992; 17 December 1992; 6 May 1993 and
20 May 1993; 30 June 1993 and 1 July 1993; 8 July
1993 and 12 and 25 May 1994, respectively).
D2i (i=1, 2)—dummy variables assuming the
unit values in the observations in which the ex-
planatory variable VAR(RATE) has anomalous
values (on 5 July 1990 and 5 May 1994).
182 TB
D1i (i=1, …,10) — dummy variables assuming
the unit value in the observations in which the re-
siduals of the same regression, albeit without arti-
ficial variables, have anomalous values (in the auc-
tions on 5 March 1990; 2 April 1990; 9 July 1990; 6
April 1992; 24 August 1992; 1 April 1993; 8 June
1993; 23 June and 5 July 1993; 7 September 1993
and 26 May 1994, respectively).
D2 assumes the unit value in an observation in
which the INDAMOUNT variable takes an anoma-
lous value (7 October 1991).
364 TB
D1i (i=1, …,6) — dummy variables assuming
the unit value in the observations in which the re-
siduals of the same regression, albeit without arti-
ficial variables, have anomalous values (in the auc-
tions on 5 June 1991; 26 August 1992; 21 October
1992; 24 March 1993; 26 May 1993 and 14 July
1993, respectively).
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